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AUTHOR Ruidl, Richard A.
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ABSTRACT

During a time of crisis, it is instructive to examine the national press of Japan and Korea, two economic allies that view each other with suspicion. The Japanese press is relatively free and liberal-oriented on the domestic scene but is closely aligned with big business and government with regard to international concerns. The South Korean government uses all the major press and mass media outlets to foster and promote the official desires of President Park. The Korean Central Intelligence Agency has infiltrated every newsroom of every newspaper and broadcasting station in Korea to insure a consistent Korean editorial policy on all domestic and international issues. For both countries, the maintenance of diplomatic and economic relations is a priority. In April 1974, two Japanese students living in Korea were arrested and charged with supplying money and materials for demonstrations and with scheming to build a communist-directed power base in Korean colleges. A study of the differing reports of the news agencies of each country concerning this crisis is instructive in demonstrating how elusive the study of comparative press systems is. (TJ)

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KOREAN AND JAPANESE PRESS:

A STUDY IN CRISIS

By

Richard A. Ruidl
PhD Student

School of Communications
University of Washington
DS-40
Seattle, Washington
98195

(206) 543-2660

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Richard A. Ruidl

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INTRODUCTION

Historically, it has been documented that the Japanese and the Korean are like oil and water--they simply don't mix. Over the years they have exchanged physical and verbal abuse. Polls have been conducted in Japan and Korea that show relations are not harmonious. (Kim, H-N, p. 993) Still, they are neighbors and are positioned in strategic geographical locations. The Free World, and the United States in particular, hold them both as key allies in the new East Asian alignment of nations. The United States has fostered diplomatic and economic communication between the two, masking or repressing feelings of mutual hostility.

The delicate understanding between Japan and the Republic of (South) Korea has been tested by a series of recent political crises. Since 1973, there have been three major confrontations: 1) the August 1973 kidnapping of and diplomatic affair over a former presidential candidate, Kim, Dae-Jung; 2) the April 1974 arrest and court martial of two Japanese students in Korea for alledged espionage activity; and 3) the August 1974 assassination attempt on President Park, Chung-Hui by a Korean resident of Japan.

What is important here is that the national press of each country built, popularized and used negative images of its traditional adversary to exacerbate the crises. It appears that news emanating from each country has passed through a filter of emotionally-charged perception thus making the maintenance of relations difficult.

It is during these crucial times one can investigate the true color of the national press. This paper will describe three foundations of journalism adopted in each country and how they

interacted during a crisis. These foundations are: 1) Influence and Influencers of the Press; 2) Press Freedoms; and the 3) Maintenance of "Special Relations" between the two Countries. The crisis in question is the case of the two Japanese students alluded to above. The case points out basic weaknesses in the tenets of Korean and Japanese friendship. The press interpretations accentuate these schisms by conveying certain negative pictures and attitudes.

INFLUENCE AND INFLUENCERS OF THE PRESS

Because this paper focuses on the negative images or propagandistic effects of national newspapers, the influence--and influencers--of the press in both societies must be clarified. (see Press Foundation of Asia, p. 119 for Japan; p. 155 for Korea) Suffice to say the Japanese press is relatively free and liberal-oriented on the domestic scene. But with regard to international concerns, Japanese newspapers become closely aligned with government and big business. These powerful elements are conservative and are fiercely nationalistic. They fear threats to anything Japanese. The press,

> "...has membership in the Establishment. It has joined the Establishment as a result of its history, because a vacuum opened as the postwar power structure took shape and the press slipped in, and because the Establishment needed the press as its communicator and transmitter of information. Moreover, the press is considered part of the intellectual community and is obliged, in the Confucian tradition of benevolent service, to use its knowledge to serve the nation. The press also has more tangible ties with the Establishment. Owners and publishers, as businessmen, are Establishment members, and many newspapers have large loans from banks and carry an increasing amount of advertising from business. Some journalists have gone into politics and yet maintained contact with their former colleagues.

> The press is thoroughly enmeshed in the Establishment's decision-making mechanism...News is covered from a preconceived point of view to fit with the consensus of the Establishment. If a consensus has not been reached, facts and interpretation are selected to influence the Establishment's decision...The main purpose of editorials and interpretative columns is to expose the thinking of the Establishment gradually to the public so that it may be eased into following the lead of the elite. The deliberate, cautious Japanese do not like surprises, nor do they care for rapid change." (Halloran, p. 171)

Kyoto University professor, Masamichi Inoki, fundamentally agreed,

> "Japanese newspapers should boldly express their evaluation of facts on the basis of the national sentiment of Japan." (Nihon Shinbun Kyokai, p. 15)

The tone of "national sentiment" is usually set in Tokyo by the Diet (Japanese Parliament) and by zaibatsu (business conglomerates). The press popularizes it.

Edward P. Whittemore, in an interpretation of Japanese press roles during the 1960 Japan-United States Security Treaty debates, generally disagreed with the collaborative press idea but mentioned that the Japanese press,

> "...not only reflects public opinion, but takes part in forming and leading it." (Whittemore, p. 7)

He intimates that the press gets help in molding public opinion from the governmental and big business decision-makers. The "oyabun-kobun" or traditional patron-dependent loyalty relationship seems to set the tone of preferred action. (John D. Mitchell, p. 578) The Japanese philosophy of working for group unanimity makes the press and government partners in promoting Japan. But, perhaps, the two aren't equal partners.

The well-known "Japan Incorporated" (used in the sense of a nuclear-type family) is proof of the close relationship govern-

ment has with big business and it has been established in Halloran's statement that the newspaper industry in Japan is big business. Hence, by deduction, one can imagine how the government can, and often does, influence the Japanese press. This shouldn't be construed as direct control, however. It is just that during international crises, particularly when there are emotional overtones like those with Korea, we can see overt governmental forces at work.

Without much argument, it can be said that the South Korean government uses all the major press and mass media outlets to foster and promote the official desires of President Park. By governmental decree, Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) officials have infiltrated every newsroom of every newspaper and broadcasting station in Korea to insure a consistent Korean editorial policy on all domestic and international issues. This problem will be addressed in the press freedoms section below. But keep in mind it takes considerable skill in reading between or behind the lines of Korean newspapers. (T.K., p. 30)

It can be said that the press plays a major part in international information programs of the governments of both countries. If a government is forced to issue an "official appropriate" pronouncement on a given critical subject, it can also encourage its national newspapers to promote an "unofficial appropriate" view almost as a matter of policy. The unofficial stance is used to assuage the domestic audience and promote a feeling of nationalism. The official proclamation, on the other hand, keeps the nation internationally respectable. Sometimes the two statements coincide promoting a consistent world view of a government and a press system.

When this happens the two are working in harmony. But, as will be shown, in crises they often vary. It is this inconsistency that becomes an object of interesting research.

PRESS FREEDOMS

A discussion of comparative press systems should touch on the question of press freedoms. The modern Japanese constitution, modeled after the American document, guarantees press freedom. But the complete and undeniable independence from coercion one might associate with the ideal is lost somewhere in the Japanese interpretation. For instance, during the allied occupation of Japan, General Douglas MacArthur decreed on September 15, 1945 that the Japanese press was being placed under "100% censorship." (Allen, p. 325) Four days later he set out a ten point program to clarify what he meant by censorship. MacArthur required, among other things, that all news strictly adhere to the truth. But it was the Supreme Commander and his subordinates who were determining truth and the right to report it. Japanese journalists had the freedom to write things as long as the allied powers deemed it appropriate and truthful. After the occupation ended, the Japan Newspaper Publishers and Editors' Association formulated a charter that established standards by which journalists should conduct business. Strangely enough , the tenets are based on MacArthur's "when convenient" press freedom guides. The charter reads, in part,

> "The press should enjoy complete freedom in reporting news and in making editorial comments, unless such activities interfere with public interests or are explicitly forbidden by law, including the freedom to comment on the wisdom of any restrictive statute." (Nihon Shinbun Kyokai, p. 1)

While the charter guards against written defamation and

sedition (which are rare in Japan--see Mowlana and Chin, p. 326), the other exceptions that are listed makes possible enormous restrictions on press freedom depending on interpretation. For example, the Japanese press has withheld types of news that would put its country in a bad international light, (Brown and Lee, p. 479) Still, the entire Japanese journalistic establishment was classified as a free press with no qualifications (Nixon, p. 12) and as a free system with only moderate controls (Lowenstein, p. 142).

The Korean government feels the Japanese press is a little too free,

> "...by leading Japan's attitude toward Korea in a bad direction." (Dong-A Ilbo, July 15, 1974)

Most Koreans fear that the Japanese don't or won't try to understand them. Koreans also suspect that Japanese read newspaper accounts about Korea which are half-truths or outright falsifications. They feel the Japanese might be using a propaganda technique of,

> "...not necessarily involving the telling of downright lies but implying them by selecting news and increasing or decreasing the apparent significance of events in accordance with biases." (J.A.C. Brown, p. 95)

The Korean vernacular, Seoul Shinmun, a newspaper directly-owned and controlled by the Park government--and a partisan of governmental ways (see Nam, p. 734)--quoted Chae, Mun-Shik, a spokesperson for the Korean New Democratic Party, as saying this about the Japanese press,

> "Free journalistic activities are valuable for those who value freedom. Distorted newspaper reports hinder promotion of mutual understanding not only between individuals but also between nations. If the Japanese newspapers act in such a way as to sincerely improve the Japanese peoples' understanding of Korea which experienced many hardships...we can look upon them as great newspapers

> which do not neglect to do what newspapers should do, enjoying freedom in the strict sense of the word...I have felt indignation when I saw that Japanese newspapers spoke ill of us and distorted facts, exercising great influence upon the Japanese people." (Seoul Shinmun, July 17, 1974)

The ROK also professes to have press freedom. Its constitution has been altered so much in the last few years, however, that it is difficult to accurately define Korean press freedom. A recent study rated the Korean fourth estate as an, "...intermediate or mixed system with tendencies appearing to favor a controlled press." (Nixon, p. 12) Another study rated the Korean system, "transitional." (Lowenstein, p. 142) Nam called his ancestral country, "somewhat controlled." (Nam, p. 730)

There are private and government-owned media operating together in modern day Korea. But press organizations and journalists, regardless of affiliation, are required to possess professional licenses issued by the Ministry of Culture and Information.

In addition to the licensing requirement, one should be cognizant of the fact that all freedoms in Korea are limited by President Park's notion of a "Korean style of democracy" or what is now called, "free democracy." This philosophy makes room for legislations restricting freedoms if public welfare or security is threatened. (Mowlana and Chin, p. 330)

In all of Korea only President Park is above press criticism. (Nam, p. 739) He has explained his immunity and his idea of press freedoms this way,

> "There exists a constant danger of a division in national public opinion, unless we create a climate of dialogue with reason and exercise thoughtfully our power of judgment regarding the common goals of our nation. My pri-

> mary objective is to strengthen the forces of independence within our society. Hence, I appreciate well-meant competition and criticism which make a positive contribution to social development. But I am also aware that unproductive confusion can arise, under the pretext of liberty, to the detriment of our advance toward national modernization. What should worry us most is the appearance of a climate in which healthy standards of criticism give way, common ideals are forgotten, and common sense is disregarded as various interests are given priority. (Park, p. 179)

As mentioned, the Korean CIA seem to be Park's operative in keeping the press in tow. By occupying key positions in the editorial staffs, news collection and dissemination can, and is, being controlled. In normal times, the press is pretty much left alone except for informal controls and extra-legal watchdogs which force editors to maintain a cautious attitude in levelling criticisms against the government. Even then, editorial people and reporters often get into trouble by deviating from the norm. The KCIA can detain, without warrant, any person who strays. (Nam, p. 740) Additionally, though news people are seldom subjected to libel complaints, the KCIA will arrest and prosecute on the grounds they had violated other laws such as those designed to control communistic activities. (Mowlana and Chin, p. 330)

Arrests and human rights violations become more frequent during crisis situations. Candid and truthful editorials can mean jail for editors and the closing down of newspaper offices. Political cartoonists who poke too much fun at politics and society are also on the KCIA list. If one reads a Korean newspaper during a crisis situation a preponderance of feature-type articles could be found.

Korean journalists aren't happy with this situation, but

they are limited in their rebuttals. Once in awhile, strikes by press people are conducted. These are, however, more symbolic than threatening. (T.K., p. 67)

On most occasions, Korean politicians need to issue "official appropriate"--sans emotion--responses with regards to Japan. Such diplomatic language preserves Japan as Korea's best trading partner. But much of what appears in the Korean newspapers about Japan reflects "unofficial appropriate" views. The leaders know that silhouetting Japan as "the bad guy" is a good rallying point for Korean nationalism. They know that Koreans dislike Japanese. And they know that Korean newspapers have traditionally played an important role in transmitting negative images of Japan. (Mobius, p. 629)

Consider these headlines, "Koreans Angered by Japan Attitude" and "History Scholar Refutes Japan's Distorted Views." Both were taken from the September 6, 1974 Korea Herald, an English language, government-owned and controlled daily. These examples indicate what the Korean leadership feels about Japan even though officially, in diplomatic language, they could never say it outright. (The fact that the paper prints in English also tends to inform foreign influentials residing in the Republic.)

On the 29th anniversary of Korea's independence from Japan (August 15, 1974), the conservative Japan Times, an English language daily in Tokyo, printed an interview with the ROK Minister of Culture and Information, Yoon, Chu-Yong. Yoon said,

> "The Korean government has never controlled the local press, although the press is prohibited from carrying articles and reporting opinions that criticize or denounce the constitution and system of (Yushin) reforms. The International Press Institute said in its report for

> this year that of over 100 world countries, only 25 enjoyed freedom of the press. The perfect press freedom is the ideal in many countries, and there are factors restricting freedom of the press in many countries because of their particular situation. So, I believe that Korea must develop the press which maintains a balance between freedom and responsibility." (Japan Times, August 15, 1974, p. 7)

Just as Korea doesn't like Japan's press attitude, so too does Japan complain about Korea's. The Japanese feel that a so-called democracy should promote a freedom of the press and allow for a wide range of domestic and foreign opinions in the marketplace. The August 24, 1973 expulsion of the sensational-oriented Yomiuri Shinbun and the February 4, 1974 ouster of the liberal-oriented Asahi Shinbun news bureaus from Seoul reinforced a negative image of Korean democracy and press freedom notions for the Japanese. But the Koreans maintained that the two newspapers weren't promoting mutual understanding between the two nations. Thus, press freedoms are another foundation of these two countries' press systems that are not in agreement.

MAINTENANCE OF SPECIAL RELATIONS

Directly related to the two previous foundations of press functioning is a third which is determined, in part, by the influencers and press freedoms. The maintenance of diplomatic and economic relations between Japan and Korea is an important priority for both sides.

Neither side denies this realization, but Koreans have said that Korea is more important to Japan than Japan is to Korea. Koreans claim that the ROK is an important market for Japanese products; a source of cheap labor for Japanese business enterprises;

and, most importantly, the defense life-line for Japan. Professor Kim, Jum-Kon of Seoul's Kyunghee University said,

> "...it is an undeniable fact that Japan directly owes to the ROK the maintenance of its security and prosperity...but Japan seems to have regarded its neighboring country only as an object for its economic interests." (Korea Herald, September 8, 1974, p. 3)

Japanese interests have responded by saying that aid given to Korea has built the country economically and socially. Appraising the situation, the conservative Japanese daily, Sankei Shinbun wrote,

> "Japan and the ROK, which are separated merely by a narrow strip of water, and which are friendly to each other as nations belonging to the Free World, should maintain close relations as if they are lips and teeth." (Sankei Shinbun, June 10, 1974)

The editorial didn't specify which one should have the bite!

The Korean Dong-A Ilbo, which tries to be the opposition paper (see Nam, p. 730), terms the relationship between the two as special, going back into history and continuing today. If the relations are special, then recently they have been especially strained, with considerable help from the press.

Koreans have hated the Japanese. And the Japanese in reciprocation have despised the Koreans. These attitudes have been held for a long time, but were fanned during Japan's 36-year occupation of the Korean peninsula. After many Koreans were taken to Japan during World War II, the Japanese government issued a widely publicized report that read,

> "In custom, Koreans are basically different from Japanese; and their general life is very unclean and unplanned. Thus it is natural that the Japanese do not like to live close to them. They are very strange and get very jealous and misunderstand things. There is a tendency for Japanese to look at them with contempt." (Richard H. Mitchell, p. 33)

The Korean minority in Japan feels this resentment in employment and education. On former President Ford's visit to Japan in 1974, it was said,

> "The Japanese think of themselves as decent and fair-minded people, yet they are as cruel and bigotted toward Koreans as American rednecks are toward blacks." (Seattle Times, November 20, 1974, p. C-3)

These popularized feelings about the Korean minority in Japan have been printed and transferred through constant conditioning to all Koreans. It was written,

> "Decades of exploitation had built up a stereotype of Koreans as unruly children, to be punished or reasoned with according to one's temperament, but to be treated paternalistically in any event; most Japanese found it almost impossible to regard them as autonomous equals. The Japanese occupation had developed Korea, albeit for Japan's own benefit; it had built harbors, factories, railroads, had raised rice production, set up systems of education and public health, and enforced its own version of law and order on the people. This had involved much repression, but the Koreans ought to be grateful for what Japan had built, or so many Japanese thought." (Olson, p. 103)

The Japanese thought of themselves as a "big brother" to Korea. But, as Osgood relates,

> "...the Koreans did not want to be a younger brother of a people for whom they had been the historical teachers. They did not want to give up their own language and to learn Japanese, and for better or worse, they preferred to determine their own destiny." (Osgood, p. 278)

Furthermore, Han wrote,

> "...the Korean people never acquiesced in Japanese rule and never abandoned their hope of independence." (Han, W-K, p. 477)

And President Park continued the argument,

> "Japan's colonial rule had infused a strong anti-Japanese feeling in the hearts of the Korean people. They could hardly rid themselves of it quickly after the liberation. Moreover, stress has been placed on anti-Japanese education thus intensifying the anti-Japanese attitude." (Park, p. 129)

The Korean government said that most of Japan's moves in Korea smacked of "big powerism." This is a charge Japanese leaders don't deny. Fuko Kubo, a spokesperson for the Moral Nation Construction Promotion Association wrote,

> "Our country, which is in a favorable situation, should take the attitude of a big power toward the ROK, which is on the forefront of opposition to communism today." (Yamato Shinbun, August 10, 1974, p. 2)

The favorable situation is economic stability. There is little doubt that this favorable condition has brought on a superior attitude toward less developed nations. Japanese foreign relations try to maintain the stability by promoting trade, sometimes by devious means. The Japanese call this power-of-money politics, "Kinken Seiji." (For a better discussion, see Johnson, p. 25)

Uneasy about negative overtones of the economic policies of Japan, the Korean press has played up the "big power" theme. Yu, Hyon-Mok, president of the Korea Movie Directors' Association clarified Korea's response to this attitude,

> "The Japanese are known in the world to be harsh to the weak while being friendly, but meek, to mighty or hostile people. The Japanese government always tries to come to good terms with the strong nations, but it is not considerate of the weak ones under any circumstances." (Korea Herald, September 6, 1974, p. 3)

He implied that if Korea acted with hostility toward Japan the two might be on a more equal plane for international negotiation. As the case will show, Korea used such a tactic.

The Dong-A Ilbo wrote this about the relationship,

> "Only when the two countries promote mutual understanding and mutual respect on an equal footing, can such feelings be removed for healthy development of the Korea-Japan relationship. So both countries should try to understand what should be understood, to criticize what should be criticized, to improve what should be improved and tolerate what should be tolerated so as to lay the foundation of mutual trust among the peoples of the two countries." (Dong-A Ilbo, July 15, 1974)

Because Japanese foreign policy has been severly fractured as a result of political in-fighting and American dependence, and because it has been based overwhelmingly on economics, the Japanese press has called this to the attention of the people. The Asahi Shinbun wrote,

> "Since Japan-ROK friendship has been maintained by the government and by limited circles around the government (namely big business), and since the friendship between the two nations has not been supported by wide strata of the people, once something happens, differences in views between the two nations are brought to light especially conspiciously." (Asahi Shinbun, July 12, 1974.)

And the Mainichi Shinbun, a moderate newspaper, editorialized,

> "...the Japanese people know very little about postwar South Korea. Japan's economic advances in South Korea are looked upon by many of the South Korean people with suspicion. On the part of Japan, efforts for wiping out such suspicions are urgently needed." (Mainichi Shinbun, May 14, 1974)

What should be gained from reading this section is that each country's press shows a high degree of sensitivity toward the actions and opinions of the other. Sometimes, occurrences are blown out of proportion making news distorted. Both countries are guilty of mixing news with emotional expressions. With this foundation and those of influencers and press freedoms in mind, one can look into the crisis situation to see how they all interrelate.

CASE STUDY

On April 3, 1974, after three months of relative quiet on Korea's college campuses, thousands of students demonstrated against the repressive Park government. They were demonstrating for the release of fellow students who had been jailed under a series of emergency decrees which had been imposed as a reaction

to North Korean diplomatic advances. But the government interpreted the riots as being a peoples' revolution aimed at destroying Korean stability. Leaders called it the first step toward communization of the South. Newspapers warned that residents should become more aware of their anti-communist responsibilities.

On the same day, Park issued the fourth and harshest emergency measure which outlawed the progressive, but not revolutionary, National Democratic Youth Student Federation (NDYSF) group which alledgedly had been instrumental in the demonstrations. The decree also effectively blocked all student gatherings, demonstrations and discussions by closing all campuses. Furthermore, he re-set penalties for anti-government activities to death or life in-prisonment. From the moment of issuance (of the emergency measure), the Korean newspapers printed government announcements just as they received them, no editorials, no commentaries.

Two Japanese nationals were arrested on April 25, 1974 after one of the indicted Korean students implicated them. Masaki Tachikawa and Yoshiharu Hayakawa were charged with supplying money and materials for demonstrations and for scheming to build a communist-directed power base in Korean colleges. Because they were temporarily living in Korea they were called the "Japanese connection." (Han, Sung-Joo, p. 38)

President Park said such activities needed to be nipped in the bud. (Newsreview Korea, April 13, 1974, p. 5) Throughout the crisis he maintained it was communist-inspired. But it was rumored that the students were arrested to take revenge on Japanese government leaders and media who had denounced the Park government. (T.K., p. 162)

Although the Japanese Embassy in Seoul watched the pre-

liminary questioning casually, they were not being totally informed by Korean officials of the seriousness of the crimes. It was assumed by the Japanese ambassador, Torao Ushiroku, that the students would be released without criminal trials. No diplomatic actions were taken. The diplomats thought the two Japanese had caused trouble and embarrassment and that the disposition of their case shouldn't interfere with the top priority of maintaining good business relations with the ROK. (T.K., p. 163)

Japanese press reports carried Ushiroku's optimism. But when the students were indicted with charges of treason and conspiracy to overthrow the Korean government, the Japanese were stunned. The press called it a "...big shock." (Asahi Shinbun, May 23, 1974; Yomiuri Shinbun, May 29, 1974)

The Japanese press expressed disbelief on how Korea could hold foreigners without following proper international rules of disposition. Deportation was a common answer for the problem. But the case was one of Korean sovereignty. It was a Korean affair. And by remaining in the upper hand of the Koreans, the case allowed the Park administration to apply significant pressure on the Japanese press and government. He even silenced them for awhile. T.K. wrote,

> "...feelings among Japanese officials may be nearing the boiling point, though they are anxious to avoid an embarrassing showdown in which the Park government would cut Japan off. This results, I think, in Japan's simply letting things pass without going into them very deeply..." (T.K., p. 180)

This indicates the Japanese government's and press' lack of concern for human rights when economic politics are involved.

When the students were ordered to appear before a court

martial, the Japanese press started an intense critical campaign, however. The Asahi Shinbun wrote,

> "...without due process...friendly relations cannot be maintained between nations. We regret the failure of the Seoul government to do enough to convince Japan of the fairness of its actions." (Asahi Shinbun, April 29, 1974)

The Mainichi Shinbun editorialized,

> "...diplomatic considerations should have been taken by the Seoul government when they arrested the two students." (Mainichi Shinbun, April 28, 1974)

The newspapers contended that it was unlikely the two students would receive a fair trial in the ROK just because the Koreans weren't a fair people. The press wanted open trials conducted before the students' relatives, the embassy and the foreign press. The foregoing could be considered an "unofficial appropriate" view of the Japanese press. The government couldn't say this directly without jeopardizing their special relations with Korea.

Japanese foreign minister, Masayoshi Ohira, said that it was incorrect for Japan to interfere with the problem. The government's stance would be to wait and see. He felt that the outcome wouldn't damage the Japanese-Korean relationship.

The Japanese opposition parties, backing the "unappropriate view" demanded that the prime minister, Kakuei Tanaka, make some official move before the upper house parliamentary elections in July, 1974. Tanaka knew that it was important for anti-Japanese movements in Korea to be quelled for his party's sake. While his official posture remained in a waiting mode, he influenced the Hitachi Company to say that they'd build an industrial complex in Korea if the government would prevent any future flare-ups. In other words, Tanaka was using the "big powerism" strategy to achieve a settle-

ment.

In the end the two Japanese received twenty-year sentences for their involvement. The Japanese press called the decision inhumane. They wondered whether it had been made clear as to what extent the Japanese were implicated. There was considerable vagueness in the charges which lead many to think the charges were trumped up to antagonize Japan. (T.K., p. 187)

South Korea countered by saying Japan was insensitive to threats of subversion. The ROK press called Japan a relay station of anti-ROK government movements. They said Japan was a haven for hostile, espionage and subversive operations by North Korean communists. Without any diplomatic or political settlement, the two students appealed their sentences to higher court martials. On February 15, 1975, the two were released and returned to Japan.

The Japanese government constantly admitted that the case of the two students in the ROK was strictly an internal and domestic affair of the Koreans. "Waiting and seeing" were the key words of the Japanese "official appropriate" view. But the press, expousing the "unofficial appropriate" view was 1) willing to be influenced by big business and clandestine government views to get support; 2) willing to give up a certain amount of press freedom to promote nationalistic goals; and 3) willing to end an era of special relations with Korea which could have toppled the Korean government. By insisting there was no possibility of a free and fair trial; by demeaning the communist threat from North Korea; and by threatening the use of economic big power, the Japanese press increased the tensions between the two nations.

CONCLUSIONS

The main point of this paper has been to show how illusive the study of comparative press systems is. When we talk of journalistic foundations, press functions and responsibilities, and newspaper influences, we must consider "other than usual" situations. It is during crisis conditions one can see how these variables work or fail or vary from the normal expectation.

The paper has also tried to indicate that relations between Japan and the ROK are not as special as diplomats would have the world believe. This realization becomes particularly clear during the 1973-1974 series of crises which exacerbated traditional hostilities.

At the risk of sounding sermonic, Japan, as one of the world's super-powers, should be more cognizant of the importance of close economic and diplomatic relations with the ROK and other Asian nations with which it has formal or informal ties. Since Japan clearly relies on many nations for its own economic survival, it must develop: 1) a policy which is consistent at all times and which is acceptable to foreign as well as domestic audiences; and 2) an era of better foreign relations which won't rely on "big powerism" or "money politics." This will require new methods of diplomacy and influence. The "unofficial appropriate" and the "official appropriate" views need to coincide, in other words. And for a people that don't compromise easily these steps toward consistency and harmony might prove difficult.

The Korean press, even though it is regulated by KCIA operatives and the ruling regime, must instill the notion that the Japanese are individuals with unique concerns not much different

from Koreans. The idea that all Japanese are the same will have to die. But old, hostile feelings of occupation days won't die easily. Nevertheless, to progress and prosper, the Koreans must forget what happened thirty years ago.

This study has tried to present a novel approach to international communication: that is, showing differences between a country's official and domestic pronouncements during a crisis. It may be useful to look at these two views in comparative research. By doing so, one can see where rhetoric and "gut" feelings depart from one another. And one doesn't necessarily have to look at crises, there seems to be some face validity of the method in all situations.

Future research might be conducted by using other Asian nations and press systems or keeping one of the protagonists of this study constant. There is residual value in comparing Japan, a relatively progressive and prosperous nation, with other Asian countries. There are still latent hostile feelings in Taiwan, China, Indonesia, the Philippines, Malaysia, Indochina and North Korea toward Japanese oppression during World War II. There are good indications from this study that these feelings could surface rather easily in almost any situation. And by looking at the press in such conditions, one could uncover some consistencies, thus, perhaps, constructing a typology of international news systems based on behaviors rather than on rather meaningless objective attributes.

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